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LABOUR RELATIONS BOARDS 
AND THE COURTS* 
J. F. W. Weotherill 
The Canada Labour Relations Board and most of our 
provincial Boards are protected in the détermination of 
the matters coming before them by « privative clauses ». 
The author questions the effect of such clauses on the 
endeavours of the Boards and more directly on their real 
jurisdiction. 
Introduction 
The Ontario Labour Relations Act provides, by section 80, that 
« No décision, order, direction, déclaration or ruling of the Board shall 
be questioned or reviewed in any court, and no order shall be made or 
process entered, or proceedings taken in any court, whether by way of 
injunction, declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo 
warranto, or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain the 
Board or any of its proceedings. » 1 The Canada Labour Relations 
Board, and most of our provincial Boards,2 are protected in their déter-
minations of the matters coming before them, by similar provisions, not 
always as sweeping or as blunt as the one I hâve quoted. This juris-
diction, thus protected from review by the courts, is an exclusive jurisdic-
tion to exercise the powers conferred by the Labour Relations Act, and 
to détermine ail questions of fact, or law that arise in any matters before 
the Board, and the Board's ac-
tion or décision thereon is final 
and conclusive for ail purpo-
WEATHERILL, J.F.W., Deputy Vice-
Chairman, Ontario Labour Relations 
Board. 
* A paper presented to the twenty-fourth annual conférence of the Canadian 
Association of Administrators of Labor Législation, Regina, August 19th, 1965. 
(1) The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., i960, c. 202, s. 80. 
(2) There is no privative clause in The Alberta Labour Act, S.A. 1959, c. 42, 
but see s. 70a of that Act, S.A. 1960, c. 54, s. 19. The powers of the British Colum-
bia Labour Relations Board to make « final and conclusive » décisions are set out 
in s. 65 of The Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 205, as amended. The 
Prince Edward Island législation is unique: see N. 45, infra. 
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ses.3 Thèse wide powers are not such as to constitute the members of 
boards « judges » within the meaning of section 96 of the British North 
America Act,4 and their jurisdiction and powers seem to hâve been 
granted by the provincial législature within the scope of its législative 
compétence.5 
Thirteen years ago, Professor Laskin wrote in the Canadian Bar 
Review that « No form of words designed to oust judicial review wiîl 
succeed in doing so against the contrary wishes of a superior court 
judge »,6 and Professor Willis has more recently criticized the courts 
for having « emasculated » privative clauses « by what amounts to a 
shameless misinterpretation of their wording ».7 Certainly it is true 
that the combined effect of sections 79 and 80 of the Ontario Act, to 
which I referred at the outset, is in reality little like what the unsophis-
ticated reader of statutes — or the average citizen — might imagine. 
But history speaks effectively, and should be heeded. The idea of literal 
interprétation of the ipsissima verba of the sovereign législature is a 
little naive, as is the understanding of the rôle of the courts in a parlia-
mentary democracy which it implies. At any rate, in my opinion it is 
neither surprising nor shocking that the courts hâve, with ease, over-
come the apparent barrier of the privative clause. Superior courts in 
the common law world hâve always assumed a jurisdiction to review, 
within limits, the work of inferior tribunals. This is not to express any 
satisfaction with the work of Canadian courts in the récent cases which 
I hâve been examining. It is the court, or the judge, rather than the 
applicable rules, which is crucial in determining the outcome of thèse 
cases. Indeed, except for the rules of natural justice, which hâve some 
useful substance and provide some real guidance, there are no rules as 
to judicial interférence which hâve sufficient particularity — or suffi-
r e n t judicial support — to be of much significance or help. One finds, 
for the most part, either cases where the court cites no authority for 
interférence with a tribunal's détermination, or cases in which the 
grounds for certiorari are recited as a pious incantation before pro-
ceeding with the sacrifice. 
(3) The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 79. 
4. Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East îron Works Ltd., [1949] 
A.C. 134, [1948] 4 D.C.R. 673. 
(5) R. v. O.L.R.B., ex parte Taylor (1964), 41 L.D.R. (2d) 456. 
(6) Laskin, Certiorari to Labour Boards : the Apparent Futility of Privative 
Clauses (1952), 30 Canadian Bar Review 986. 
(7) Willis, Administrative Law in Canada (1961), 39 Canadian Bar Review 258. 
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While it is obvious that the courts do not heed the apparently plain 
provisions of privative clauses excluding them from any considération 
of a Labour Relations Board matter, it does not follow that the privative 
clause is useless verbiage. And while it is désirable that administrative 
tribunals should not be interfered with by the courts so as to defeat the 
purposes for which they were established, it is also désirable that thèse 
tribunals be subject to some form of control, in the interests of an orderly 
légal System, as well as justice in individual cases. The declared basis 
of judicial intervention seems to me to be incontrovertible, namely, 
that an administrative tribunal or agency cannot, by an erroneous inter-
prétation of its statute, confer upon itself a jurisdiction which it other-
wise would not hâve.8 Just what is meant by « jurisdiction » is the 
real issue, and it is one involving the attitudes of judges toward their 
own rôles and their préjudices regarding administrative tribunals. 
What is Meant by Jurisdiction 
The question is, who décides what? Jurisdiction, in the présent 
context, means authority to décide, whether correctly or incorrectly. 
Where courts quash the décisions of boards on grounds of incorrect 
décision, it means the board is required to décide a certain point cor-
rectly and in no other way. A duty is imposed to make the partîcular 
décision the court wants. Thus, for example, the Police Méchantes ca-
se. 9 Hère the court quashed a décision of the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board that mechanics were excluded from the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act, under section 2 (g) of the Act. This détermination 
required an interprétation of The Police Act.10 In the resuit, the Board 
was required by the court to consider certain particular persons as 
within the scope of the Labour Relations Act. The Board, that is to 
say, had no jurisdiction to décide the question of the scope of the Act. 
This use of the term « jurisdiction » may be a somewhat spécial use of 
language. As such, it should not surprise lawyers, but nevertheless it 
seems to be at the root of many problems which hâve arisen. To say 
the Board had no « jurisdiction » to décide the issue is not at ail the 
same thing as to say it had no business in deciding it. Yet this is what, 
(8) Jarvis v. Associated Médical Services 35 D.L.R. (2) 375, 380 (Ont. C.A.) 
per Aylesworth, J.A. The décision was affirmed by the Suprême Court of Canada 
(1964) 44 P.L.R. (2d) 407, and thèse remarks were adopted by Cartwright J. 
at p. 411. 
(9) R. v. O.L.R.B., ex parte C.U.P.D. Local 453 (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 202 
(Ont.). 
(10) R.S.O. 1960, c. 298, s. 13. 
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for a tirne, it seemed the Ontario Court of Appeal was maintaining. The 
judgment of the late Mr. Justice Laidlaw, giving the opinion of the 
court in the Ontario Food Terminal Board case, n included the following 
statement (referring to the question whether the Ontario Food Terminal 
Board was a Crown Agency, and hence within the purview of the 
Labour Relations Act) : « I may say at once that in my opinion the On-
tario Labour Relations Board had no right or power to détermine that 
question. It is a pure question of law which can be determined only 
by a Judge or Judges appointed by the Governor General pursuant to 
the provisions of the British North America Act.» While admitting 
that any tribunal had to make a preliminary décision whether to hear 
a case or not, he went on to give his opinion that « when the question 
of jurisdiction or any other question of pure law is raised in a proceeding 
before a tribunal so constituted, the proceeding should be stayed until 
such question has been finally determined by a court of compétent 
jurisdiction. » 12 As Professor Laskin pointed out in a critical note,1S 
it is one thing to say that déterminations of this sort whether described 
as collatéral or not are subject to judicial review. It is quite another 
thing to say that the Labour Relations Board is constitutionally inca-
pable of making them as part of the routine of its function. This ex-
trême view has, I am happy to say, won no acceptance, and indeed it 
conflicts with previous judgments of the Suprême Court of Canada and 
of the Privy Council. In the Taylor case,14 which came before the 
courts a few months after the Food Terminal case, Chief Justice McRuer, 
reviewing the authorities concluded that « the sections of the Labour 
Relations Act in question are constitutional and I do not think it was 
beyond the powers of the législature to clothe the Labour Relations 
Board with jurisdiction to make décisions of law incidental to its admi-
nistrative duties. Obviously the Board must décide many incidental 
questions of law in the performance of its administrative functions but 
in saying this I do not wish it to be taken that I think that the Board 
has power to make décisions in law with respect to collatéral matters 
which may not be reviewed on certiorari. In other words, it cannot 
give itself jurisdiction by wrong décisions in law. » It is gratifying that 
the rather slighting view of Laidlaw J.A. concerning the «légal com-
(11) R. v. O.L.R.B. ex parte Ont. Food Terminal Board (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 
530, 532 (Ont. C.A.). 
(12) Idem. 
(13) (1963) 41 Canadian Bar Review 446. 
(14) Supra, N. 5. See also the remarks of Haines, J. in Armstrong Transport v 
înt'l Brotherhood of Teamsters (1963) 64 C.L.L.C. 804. (Ont.). 
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petence » of Boards (he denied they had any, and characterized their 
intervention in such questions as «unauthorized and unlawful»), may 
now be set beside the more flattering view of Mr. Justice Abbott (giving, 
alas, a minority view). In the Associated Médical Services case15 he 
stated that « A Board such as the Labour Relations Board, experienced in 
the field of labour management relations, representing both organized 
employer s, organized labour, and the public, and presided over by a 
legally trained chairman, ought to be at least as compétent and as well 
suited to détermine questions arising in the course of the administration 
of the Act as a Superior Court Judge». 
Specialized Tribunals for Specialized Matters 
So, I believe, it was intented. For specialized matters of fréquent 
occurrence, involving continually the interests of certain defined interest 
groups, and calling for some degree of expertise, a specialized tribunal 
is necessary. The establishment of boards or commissions having broad 
powers both of investigation and of action is nothing new — and neither 
is judicial review of their endeavours. Whether the resuit of judicial 
review is seen as the frustration of a worthwhile législative enterprise, 
or the préservation of individual liberty against tyrannical excess dé-
pends, not just on one's point of view, but on the nature of the case. 
Where législation embodying a basic social concensus — such as our 
labour relations législation — is concerned, the duty of the courts is to 
lend assistance to the effecting of its purpose. This requires, I suggest, 
a fair appréciation of the tasks to be performed by Labour Relations 
Boards and confirmation of the confidence which législatures hâve 
placed in them. The history of judicial review, however, is largely a 
history of intereference — sometimes very laudable and for the best of 
motives, sometimes simply as resuit of reactionary attitudes. The writ 
of certiorari may be followed through six centuries — a fact which 
should provoke our minds to wondering why we haven't developed a 
somewhat more sophisticated set of rules for its issue. 
I hope it is true, as Abbott J. suggested, that members of Boards are 
at least as compétent as Judges to décide questions arising in the course 
of the administration of the Labour Relations Acts. But difficulty arises 
because the question of jurisdiction itself is not a question « arising in 
the course of the administration of the Act» — or rather, it appears to 
(15) Supra, N. 8 at p. 412. 
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most of our judges not to be such a question. Hère again, the meaning 
of the term is in issue, and the hard question of practical politics is, 
who ought to décide what? In any case, isn't it true that every détermi-
nation necessary for the implementation of a statute involves the making 
of other déterminations (usually of a simple, unobjectionable kind), 
which take the décider outside the strict confines of the Act? In com-
menting16 on the Ontario Food Terminais case, in which the court 
considered the correctness of the Board's détermination that the Food 
Terminais Board was not a Crown Agency, Professor Laskin pointed 
out that the Board's function in such a case was like the function it 
might be called upon to perform with relation to section 2 of the Labour 
Relations Act, by which members of a police force within the meaning 
of The Police Act, full-time firefighters within the meaning of The Fire 
Department Act, and teachers as defined in The Teaching Profession 
Act are excluded from the purview of the labour relations législation. 
« The Ontario Court of Appeal », he wrote, « would hâve it that the 
Labour Relations Board can no more décide any of thèse questions than 
it can décide whether a statutory agency enjoys Crown immunity. » Of 
course, Boards can, must, and do décide such questions — but it was 
just such a question — namely whether certain persons were excluded 
as members of a police force — on which the courts intervened to quash 
a décision of the Ontario Board. And in the Associated Médical Ser-
vices case,17 7 of the 9 Judges who sat in the Suprême Court of Canada 
(and ail of the Ontario Court of Appeal) held that it was proper for 
the court to consider the merits of the Board's décision that a certain 
complainant was a « person » for the purposes of the Labour Relations 
Act. The basis of interférence, of course, is that the question is « colla-
téral », « extrinsic » or « preliminary », that it goes to the question of 
jurisdiction. Thèse assertions need to be analysed, and not merely by 
the puzzled victim, but by the courts themselves. Such analysis is, in 
the majority of cases, not to be found. To say that a question is « colla-
téral » or « preliminary » is not to apply a test, or state a criterion, but 
rather, to announce a resuit. There is no doubt that any test or crite-
rion of jurisdiction would hâve to be of as gênerai nature as, say, the 
test of reasonable conduct in the law of torts, but such a test at least 
has the virtue of reminding the décider as well as his critics that thèse 
are not simply questions of black or white. What needs to be consi-
dered is the concept of « jurisdiction », and the pros and cons of a rela-
(16) Supra, N. 13. 
( 17 ) Supra, N. 8. Spence, J., who dissented in the resuit, agreed with the majority 
on this point. 
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tively broad, as opposed to a relatively narrow concept. The word just 
does not hâve the simple meaning which the language of the cases would 
suggest. The possibilités may be arranged in a sort of spectrum : at 
one end, put the question whether certain opérations of an employer 
are subject to the législation, with respect to labour relations, of the 
Province or of the Dominion. This is a question of constitutional law, 
and it is a question over which the courts hâve jurisdiction. The Boards 
of course, despite the strictures of Laidlaw J.A. must, when faced with 
such an issue, décide it, but they hâve no jurisdiction to décide it other 
than correctly. 
Next to constitutional questions, consider gênerai questions of inter-
prétation, such as the meaning of « day » or « month » which probably 
could not be said to hâve a spécial meaning under the Labour Relations 
Act. Another sort of question which there is not much doubt a court 
would détermine is the question going to the status of the board, and 
including, perhaps, questions of the propriety of appointments of board 
members (although, by section 80, quo warronto is excluded).18 The 
whole set of rules ôf natural justice fall into this category, as Boards are 
said to « lose jurisdiction » by their breach. 
Somewhere about the middle of the spectrum I would place ques-
tions such as those mentioned earlier : is a person a member of a 
police force?19 is he, indeed, a « person »?2 0 Thèse questions un-
doubtedly involve référence to matters and statutes extrinsic to the 
Labour Relations Act itself; and yet at the same time they invoive con-
sidération of circumstances of the sort with which the statute is prima-
rily concerned. How différent, then, is the question whether a certain 
person is an employée of a particular employer? This question surely 
involves many considérations extrinsic to the statute, but at the same 
time it goes to the heart of the matter with which Labour Relations 
Boards are concerned. The Suprême Court of Canada, in the Traders 
Service case,21 held that this question was entirely within the jurisdic-
tion of the Labour Relations Board of British Columbia.22 Of a similar 
shade, I think, is the question whether an organization is a trade union, 
(18) Supra, N. 1. 
(19) See N. 9, supra. 
(20) See N. 8, supra. 
(21) Labour Relations Board and Att'y-Gen. for B.C. v. Traders* Service Ltd. 
(1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 305 (S.C.C.). 
(22) Some of the court's language in the White Lunch case (1963) 42 D.L.R. 
(2d) 364 (B.C.) is surely suspect in view of the Traders Service décision. 
LABOUR RELATIONS BOARDS AND THE COURTS 65 
a question, again, over which the Board's jurisdiction has been confirmed 
by the Suprême Court of Canada.23 At the other end of the spectrum 
are questions over which the Board's jurisdiction is clear, questions 
concerning unfair labour practices,24 I suggest, or, clearest of ail, per-
haps, the question whether a person, being an employée, is a member 
of the trade union involved.25 Express référence to the board of ques-
tions of employment status, such as whether a person exercises mana-
gerial functions, and of the appropriateness of bargaining units makes 
it abundantly clear that such questions are for Boards alone to décide, 
whether a court agrées with the décision or not. (I am aware that cases 
involving bargaining units hâve been before the courts several times, 
but I think thèse will be found to turn on questions of natural justice, 
or particular limiting provisions of the statutes concerned, rather than 
on the merits of the détermination itself.) 
The Distinction Berween « Collatéral » and « Main » Question 
The sorts of questions which may arise in the course of a Board's 
administration of the matters coming before it may thus be arranged on 
a spectrum from clearly reviewable to clearly not reviewable. The dif-
ficulty is that the judicial criterion is of an either-or variety : does a 
question go « to the very essence of the enquiry » (that is, is it beyond 
review), or is it «extrinsic», «collatéral», « preliminary » or «not the 
main question the tribunal has to décide», (that is, subject to review)? 
Thèse phrases, I hâve suggested, are really descriptive of resuit. Any 
question which a tribunal has to décide before it can make its décision 
is, in a sensé, necessary, and can hardly be called « extrinsic ». In other 
jurisdictions in the common-law word, courts hâve been able to state 
somewhat more significant criteria. Dixon J. set out the view of the 
23. Labour Relations Board of British Columbia v. Oliver Co-operative Growers 
Exchange and Okanagan Federated Shipping Association. (1962) 35 D.L.R. (2d) 
694. (S.C.C.). See also Re Hamilton Construction Association à- Builders' Exchange 
and Ontario Labour Relations Board (1963) 39 D.L.R. (2d) 338 (Ont.). 
24. Re Westeel Products Ltd. and Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board (1963) 
39 D.L.R. (2d) 108 (Sask. C.A.). See also R. v. Labour Relations Board (B.C.) 
ex parte Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada, Watson Island, Local No. 4 (1964) 
45 D.L.R. (2d) 437 (B.C.). 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board to 
détermine the question whether a matter is arbitrable was confirmed in Re Galloway 
Lumber Co. Ltd. and British Columbia Labour Relations Board (1965) 48 D.L.R. 
(2d) 587 (S.C.C.). 
25. See Re Ontario Labour Relations Board, Bradley v. Canadian General Electric 
Co. Ltd. (1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 65, (Ont. C.A.). 
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High Court of Australia in The King v. Hickman,26 where the privative 
clause was not unlike that in the Ontario Labour Relations Act, as 
follows : 
« - - They are not interpreted as meaning to set at large the courts 
or other j'udicial bodies to whose décision they relate. Such a clause is 
interpreted as meaning that no décision which is in fact given by the 
body concerned shall be invalidated on the ground that it has not con-
formed to the requirements governing its proceedings or the exercise 
of its authority or has not confined its acts within the limits laid down 
by the instrument giving it authority, provided always that its décision 
is a bona fide attempt to exercise its power, that it relates to the sub-
ject matter of the législation, and that it is reasonably capable of 
référence to the power given to the body. » 
On this test, many of the Canadian certiorari cases would hâve 
been decided differently. The détermination of the issue whether a 
Board's décision « reasonably refers » to the power granted it remains, 
pf course, within the jurisdiction of the courts. Mr. Justice Spence, in 
his opinion given in the Associated Médical Services case,27 urges, in 
effect, that the criterion suggested by Dixon J. begs the question, since, 
where an inferior tribunal interprets the power granted to it in broader 
terms than the court thought proper, then the court would simply con-
clude that the exercise of the Board's power was not « reasonably ca-
pable of référence » to the power given it. With respect, this view is 
unfair to judges. Similar reasoning would reduce any test of« reason-
ableness » to one of « judge's préférence », and while the results some-
times suggest such a thing, it would be wrong to conclude it was the 
gênerai rule. 
Canadian cases, nevertheless, continue on the basis of a distinction 
between collatéral matters, reviewable by courts, and questions going 
to the main issue the Board must décide, as to which its jurisdiction is 
exclusive. In one of the rare Canadian Judgments examining the cri-
teria by which the distinction might be drawn in any case, Mr. Justice 
Freedman, giving the judgment of the Manitoba Court of Apppeal in 
26. The King v. Hickman, ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598, 614-5. 
A similar test was suggested to Canadians by Rand, J. in his dissenting judgment 
in Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co. [1953] 3 D.L.R. 561, 572-3 
(S.C.C. ): «—is the action or décision within any rational compass that can be 
attributed to the statutory language ? » 
(27) Supra, N. 8. 
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the Parkhill Bedding case,28 examined the leading cases in which it had 
been held that the issue before the Board was a collatéral or preliminary 
question. The common factor in thèse cases, Freedman J. pointed out, 
was that the point for détermination involved an examination of légal 
principles and considérations that went beyond the simple confines of 
the statute under which the Board operated. However, as I hâve argued 
earlier, every case involves reliance on principles beyond the simple 
confines of the statute : it is a question of degree. 
While the distinction between « collatéral » and « main » questions 
continues to be drawn, and as a rule, drawn without any real analysis, 
I cannot leave discussion of the problem of jurisdiction without réfé-
rence to the remarks of Lord Esher, made in the Income Tax Commis-
sioners case,29 and referred to with approval by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in the Bradley case.30 Lord Esher suggested that in some cases 
the législature might « entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, 
which includes the jurisdiction to détermine whether the preliminary 
state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does 
exist, to proceed further or do something more ». Judicial intervention, 
in such a case, would be a stage removed. 
The Rules of Naturel Justice 
Where a tribunal which is required to act judicially fails to do so, 
it deprives itself of the jurisdiction it would otherwise hâve. Its décision 
in such circumstances, is no longer « really » a décision. The rules of 
natural justice are thus a spécial chapter in the question of jurisdiction. 
Thèse are well-documented and, speaking generally, there is nothing 
(28) Parkhill Bedding 6- Furniture Ltd. v. International Molders 6- Foundry 
Workers Union of North America, Local 174 and Manitoba Labour Board. (1961) 
26 D.L.R. (2d) 589 (Man. C.A.). 
29. R. v. Cornrs for Spécial Purposes of Income Tax Act (1888), 21 Q.B.D. 313. 
30. Supra, N. 25. Cp. De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1959) 
72, 73 : 
« We hâve hitherto considered only two classes of situations : (i) a tribunal 
has to inquire into a question, and its findings thereon are conclusive because they 
are not preliminary or collatéral to the merits ; ( ii ) a tribunal has to inquire into 
a question and its findings thereon are reviewable because they are preliminary 
or collatéral to the merits. But there is a third class of situation : a tribunal has to 
inquire into a question which is preliminary or collatéral, but its findings thereon 
are conclusive because of the wording of the relevant législation — e.g., where a 
matter collatéral to the merits is to be proved « to the satisfaction of » the com-
pétent authority. The scope of judicial review in this third class of situation is the 
same as in the first class of situation, and the two are often confused with each 
other, although they are analytically distinct. » 
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remarkable in the récent Canadian cases on this score. Questions of 
bias of course are very likely to arise in tribunals constituted in tripartite 
form, because of the interests with which the représentative members 
are associated. Interesting légal developments on this question are more 
likely to arise with respect to the opérations of arbitration boards, where 
the statutory sanction is less clear, and the likelihood of impartiality 
far less. 
Questions of lack of notice arise with disturbing frequency. I must 
admit it is a surprise, on reading some of the reported décisions, to dis-
cover that évidence, or some communication containing evidentiary as-
sertion would be received by a Board without the other party being so 
informed. Thèse lapses are most likely to occur, I think, after there 
has been a hearing and where further information is needed. Surely 
it is the rule that wherever information may aclversely affect a party 
other than the informant, then that other party must be apprised of the 
information. The same is true of argument. It is not always necessary 
that opportunity for reply be given. Some comfort may be taken from 
the décision of the Suprême Court of Canada in the Forest Industrial 
Relations case,31 in which Judson J., giving the judgment of the court, 
stated, « after hearing from one side, and hearing from the other side 
in reply, it is not a departure from the rules of natural justice for the 
Board to hold that the debate had gone on long enough and that it was 
time to stop ».32 I should add that in the more récent Loomis Armored 
Car Service case,33 Forest Industrial Relations is distinguished on the 
basis that in that case, the parties had ample opportunity of knowing 
each other submissions and were allowed to cross-examine on those 
submissions. Hère, the court said in the latter case, there was nothing 
even resembling a debate. One party was allowed to see the submis-
sions of the other party and to reply to them. But that reply was not 
shown to the other party and they knew nothing of it until certification 
was granted. Even in the area of natural justice, however, there are 
one or two ominous signs. In the Jim Patrick case,34 the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal quashed a certification on the ground there was a 
déniai of natural justice in the refusai to grant an adjournment. In that 
(31) Forest Industrial Relations Ltd. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
882, (1961) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 319 (S.C.C.). 
(32) ld„ a t p . 321. 
(33) R. v. Labour Relations Board (B.C.;) ex parte Loomis Armored Car Service 
Ltd. (1963) 42 D.L.R. (2d) 49 (B.C.). 
(34) Jim Patrick Ltd. v. United Stone ir Allied Products Workers of America, 
Local No. 189, AFL-CIO. (1959), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 189 (Sask. C.A.). 
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case the responsible officer of the company was away on a motor trip 
to Mexico when an application for certification was made. Probably 
the court was moved by the circumstance that the Board seems to hâve 
said to the company's solicitor that an adjournment would be granted, 
but when the case came on, heard it. One would hope, in any event, 
'that this décision does not mean that a court will always intervene when, 
in its view, an adjournment should hâve been given, or, in particular, 
that a case must await the availability of a party. 
A somewhat disturbing variation on the notions underlying the 
requirements of notice appears in questions dealing with the réception 
of évidence. A characteristic of the matters coming before Labour 
Relations Boards is that certain facts or types of facts are récurrent. In 
particular, the question whether an organization is a trade union is a 
question that arises, with respect to the same organizations or cognate 
organizations, time after time. Although the courts hâve recognized 
the Boards' exclusive jurisdiction in this regard, their procédure in 
exercising that jurisdiction is still open to supervision. Does this require 
a full-dress investigation to support the finding in each case? It is not 
; likely, and the common statutory provisions giving Boards the right to 
establish their own procédure, subject to the right of the parties to be 
heard, probably support this obvious requirement of common sensé. 
Some basis for the finding must be established in any case. 
In the Trenton Construction Workers Association case,35 where an 
organization's status as a trade union was in issue, the court held that 
the Ontario Labour Relations Board erred in resorting to évidence that 
had been given before a Board differently constituted in regard to 
another application. It would seem to me that if this is error, it would 
be error regardless of the constitution of the panel hearing the case. 
The Board relied upon material set out in the endorsement of the record 
in an earlier case. If the décision means that findings of fact in previous 
cases may never be relied on, then I submit with respect that it goes too 
far. It can be supported, I suggest, as finding the Board to be in error 
in relying on the évidence in another case as establishing anything more 
than the facts there found. Whether there are any real dangers hère 
for the efficient conduct of Boards' regular business remains to be seen. 
(35) R. v. O.L.R.B. ex parte Trenton Construction Workers Association, Local 52 (1963) 39 D.L.R. (2d) 593 (Ont). 
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« Error of Law on the Face of the Record » 
The question which the Board had determined in the Trenton Cons-
truction Workers case was whether an organization was a trade union. 
The rightness or wrongness of this décision in itself would not be re-
viewable on certiorari. It was admitted by counsel for the Board, howe-
ver, that if it appeared on the face of the order of the Board that it con-
sidered évidence it could not legally consider, or if the Board misinter-
preted the statute under which it made its order, then the Board's order 
ought to be set aside. It may be that counsel admitted more than he 
needed to : it raises the last ground of review which I wish to consider, 
and the most confusing : « error of law on the face of the record ». This 
is a difficult phrase to understand. It is asserted as a ground for review 
side by side with the assertion that déterminations made within a board's 
jurisdiction are not open to review even where there is error of fact or 
of law.36 « Error of law on the face of the record », then, is some spé-
cial sort of mistake. In the Tags Plumhing case37 the finding of the 
Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board that an applicant in an unfair 
labour practice case was a trade union « directly concerned » with cer-
tain events was attacked on certiorari. Having found that such a matter 
was within the Board's jurisdiction, so that the order could not be at-
tacked on that basis, Culliton J.A. went on to deal with the argument 
that there was error of law on the face of the record. He said « The 
allégation of error of law on the face of the record can only be substan-
tiated if the Board is bound not only to record its findings, but also the 
évidence upon which the findings were based. » It was concluded that 
the Board was not so bound. Counsel for the applicant had referred 
the court to the judgment of MacDonald J.A. speaking for the Saskat-
chewan Court of Appeal in the John East case,38 that « not only is it 
the duty of the Board to find the necessary facts, but it is also its duty 
to record them. » In Tags Plumhing Culliton J.A. went on to say that 
he did not construe that statement as a requirement that the Board 
(36) Thus, Balfour J. in R. v. Sakaschewan Labour Relations Board, ex parte 
Dickl (1963) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 79, 85 (Sask. Q.B.): « In dealing with an application 
for a writ of certiorari, and having regard to [the privative clause], it appears to 
me that the décisions of the Board are not open to judicial review, including 
certiorari, even if there was error in matter of fact or in law and that I am restricted 
to détermine whether or not the Board acted within its jurisdiction or whether 
there is error of law on the face of the record ». 
(37) R. v. Labour Relations Board of Sask., ex parte Tag's Plumbing and Heating 
Ltd (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 128 (Sask. C.A.). 
38. Supra, N. 4. See also MacCosham Storage ér Distributing Co. (Saskatchewan) 
Ltd. v. Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employées and Other Transport Workers, 
Division No. 189. 14 D.L.R. (2d) 725 (Sask. C.A.). 
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record the évidence upon which its findings are based. But ail this 
seems to carry the implication that a court will review the correctness of 
conclusions drawn by Boards from the évidence in cases where the 
Boards see fit to describe such évidence in their décision. What then 
as to the right of Boards to be « wrong », provided they act within their 
jurisdiction? A jurisdiction to be right only is no jurisdiction, as that 
term is used in this context. 
The mystery — or mystique — of this ground of review can I think 
be explained on a historical basis. The modem case which has made 
the idea of « error of law on the face of the record » common coin in 
the Northumberland case,39 which has been referred to in many Cana-
dian décisions. It was there held for the first time that certiorari would 
issue to quash the décisions of a statutory administrative tribunal for 
error of law on the face of the record. This was in reality a new appli-
cation of a long-established principle. From the 17th century the King's 
Bench had issued certiorari to quash convictions and orders of inferior 
courts (the Northumberland case extends this to tribunals). And in aid 
of this process, the courts had gone to some lengths in requiring the 
lower courts to complète their records — that is, to provide the rope 
with which they would be hung. Convictions were quashed for error 
of substantive law, for what seemed to be lack of évidence on a material 
point or for trivial formai defects. Parliament retaliated with the pri-
vative clause, and with Summary Procédure Statutes, and finally by 
prescribing in the Summary Procédure Act, 1848, a standard form of 
conviction that omitted ail mention of the évidence or the reasoning by 
which the conviction had been reached. This did not alter the law 
relating to certiorari, but it made it virtually impossible for the courts 
to correct errors of law other than those going to jurisdiction, since 
évidence in a certiorari application may not be admitted to prove lack 
of évidence or concealed error of law. The « face of the record » then 
became, in the words of Lord Sumner, «the inscrutable face of 
sphinx ».40 For this reason « error of law on the face of the record » 
was little used until it was applied to administrative tribunals in 1952. 
While it is likely the case that Boards would not actually be required to 
expand the record so as to include the sort of material which would sup-
port review, nevertheless it is surely undesirable that they should be led, 
in the hope of protecting themselves, to reduce the records now pro-
(39) R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw [1951] 
1 K.B. 711, affU [1952] 1 K.B. 338 (C.A.). 
(40) R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A.C. 128, 159. 
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duced — that is, to avoid giving substantial reasons. In summary 
conviction cases lengthy reasons are of little practical use, but in matters 
such as those coming before the Labour Relations Boards there is a 
continuing clientèle, and the giving of reasons, is, it is hoped, of some 
value. In any event, during the century — long désuétude of « error 
of law on the face of the records », courts had accustomed themselves 
to treating a wide range of errors of law and fact as going to jurisdiction. 
This, I suggest, is enough. 
The Question of the Privative Clause 
I should like now to return to the question of the privative clause. 
No privative clause, nothing short of reconstitution of our whole judicial 
System, will prevent the courts from supervising the jurisdiction of infe-
rior courts or statutory tribunals, as has been demonstrated. The pri-
vative clause, however, should be given its proper effect, that is, pre-
venting the courts from supervising the work of the Boards within that 
jurisdiction. In attempting to understand the proper opération of the 
privative clause we should, I think, consider what the situation would 
be without one. It would not be the case that the courts would interfère 
at will. Just because certiorari proceedings may be freely brought has 
never meant that a court would, in every case, concern itself with the 
merits of the contested détermination. There hâve been, broadly speak-
ing, two grounds for certiorari : 1) defect of jurisdiction (in which I 
include déniai of natural justice, and fraud) and 2) error of law on the 
face of the record. But without the establishment of one of thèse 
grounds, there would be no certiorari, even in the absence of a privative 
clause, and even if the court considered the détermination to be wrong. 
We ail know that were there is a privative clause, it does not prevent 
certiorari where ground 1 ) is established — defect of jurisdiction. The 
effect of a privative clause, then, must be the élimination of ground 2) 
as a basis for certiorari. This indeed seems to be the effect of the judg-
ment of Roach J.A. speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal in the 
Bradley case : 4 1 
« Where the matter is not collatéral but constitutes part or the whole 
of the main issue which the inferior tribunal had to décide, the Court 
is limited to examining the record to détermine whether there was any 
évidence before the inferior tribunal. I hasten to add, however, iJiat 
the Court can do that only in the absence of a privative clause. If 
there is a privative clause in the Act creating the tribunal, the Court 
cannot do that. » 
41. Supra, N. 25. 
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In the Parkhill Bedding case, 42 Mr. Justice Freedman, referring to 
this passage, spoke of it as touching upon a distinction as between priva-
tive clauses. With respect, a distinction based on the relative explicitness 
of privative clauses seems to me rather forced (assuming the form of 
words is explicit enough to be a privative clause in the first place), and 
at any rate there is no such distinction in the judgment of Roach J.A. 
who refers only to the distinction between the case where there is a pri-
vative clause and the case where there is not. A distinction as between 
privative clauses is, nevertheless, being drawn by our courts. Thus, in 
the Fédéral Electric case43 Smith J. stated : 
« In my view, it is at least doubtful that the privative clause in the 
Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (s. 61(2)), is 
sufficiently express in its terms to exclude certiorari where the question 
is one of error on the face of the record. No privative clause excludes 
an application for certiorari where the question is one of the inferior 
tribunal having jurisdiction, refusing jurisdiction or exceeding juris-
diction. » 
Conclusion 
The only conclusion left, it seems to me, is that the privative clause 
in the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act means nothing, 
since, on Smith J's reasoning, it cannot exclude certiorari on ground (1) 
and is not «express» enough to exclude it on ground (2) . The only 
possible ground for optimism hère is the thought that presumably some 
privative clause might mean something, as long as it is sufficiently « ex-
press ». De Smith suggests this in his work on Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action, and cites Australian and New Zealand authority 
for the proposition.44 The Bradley case, which was contemporaneous 
with De Smith's work, would hâve provided a strong Canadian autho-
rity. 
It is worth nothing that in Prince Edward Island the court sees the 
merit of privative clauses. In the Journal Publishing case, 45 in which 
the court held, on appeal (for such is their procédure), reversing the 
Labour Relations Board, that the Charlottetown chartered local of the 
(42) Supra, N. 28. 
(43) R. v. Canada Labour Relations Board, ex parte Fédéral Electric Corporation 
(1964) 44 D.L.R. (2d) 440, 458 (Man. Q.B.). 
(44) De Smith, op. cit. supra, N. 30, at p. 228 N. 
(45) Journal Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Charlottetown Typographical Union, Local 
963 (1964) 44 D.L.R. (2d) 711 (P.E.I. S.C.). 
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International Typographical Union was not a trade union within the 
meaning of the Industrial Relations Act, Tweedy J. stated : 
« It was alleged by counsel that this is the only Province in Canada 
that gives this right of appeal to the Suprême Court nor has the right 
been given by Législatures in the various states of the United States 
of America. I might digress to say that in my opinion the inclusion of 
such a right of appeal defeats many purposes of the Act. 
Tweedy J. concluded his judgment in the case simply by noting, 
rather wistfully, the provisions of section 80 of the Ontario Act, the pri-
vative clause with which we began. 
To anyone attempting to analyse (as far as they allow) the cases 
decided in this field, their most striking and depressing characteristic 
is the lack of considération of the real issues which were before the 
courts in thèse cases. On the question of jurisdiction, for instance, the 
real issue, I suggest, is : who is to détermine this sort of question? The 
adoption of a criterion such as that suggested by Dixon J., or by Rand 
J., while it would in itself, solve no problems, would at least hâve the 
virtue of focussing our attention on real problems, rather than forms of 
words. Even although the question of jurisdiction must be, in the final 
analysis, up to the courts, it is nevertheless a problem which each of us, 
in the course of carrying out our duties, must face. In the form of 
questions of natural justice, I think, it présents its most serious aspect.48 
It would be helpful to hâve some considered judicial détermination 
with respect to problems of notice as thèse arise in labour relations 
matters, because thèse problems do arise in a peculiar form in this area. 
But thèse are our problems even before they go to the courts, and we 
must constantly remind ourselves that, could we but achieve a just equi-
librium between the demands of efficiency and gênerai justice on the 
one hand, and the rights of the individual and particular justice on the 
other, then judicial review of our proceedings would be superfluous. 
LES COMMISSIONS DE RELATIONS DE TRAVAIL 
ET LES TRIBUNAUX 
INTRODUCTION 
« Le Conseil canadien des relations ouvrières » et la plupart de nos Commis-
sions provinciales possèdent une compétence exclusive dans les cas qui leur sont 
(46) See Finkelman, The Ontario Labour Relations Board and Natural Justice 
(1965) Queens University Industrial Relations Centre, Reprint Séries No. 7. 
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soumis, en vertu de textes restrictifs de l'intervention judiciaire (privative clauses), 
contenus dans les lois qui les régissent. Au tout début du texte original nous citons 
la section 80 de la Loi des relations de travail de l'Ontario qui est explicite à ce 
sujet. 
Cette compétence exclusive place donc les Commissions à l'abri de la révision 
des tribunaux. Cependant, ces pouvoirs ne sont pas larges au point de constituer 
les membres des tribunaux, au sens de la section 96 de l'Acte de l'Amérique du 
Nord. De plus, leur compétence et leurs pouvoirs semblent avoir été accordés par 
les législatures provinciales dans les limites de leur compétence législative. 
Il y a treize ans, le professeur Laskin écrivait qu'« aucun libellé de texte 
tentant d'éviter la révision judiciaire ne sera effective advenant les désirs contraires 
d'un juge d'un tribunal supérieur », et plus récemment, le professeur Willis a 
blâmé les tribunaux d'avoir « émasculé » les « clauses privatives » à ce qui équivaut 
à une misinterprétation honteuse de leur libellé. Mais l'histoire parle efficacement 
et on doit en tenir compte. L'idée d'interpréter à la lettre les mots eux-mêmes de la 
législature souveraine est un peu naïve. Les tribunaux supérieurs dans le monde 
du « common law » ont toujours eu le pouvoir de réviser, à l'intérieur de limites, 
le travail des tribunaux inférieurs. En effet, à l'exception des règles du droit naturel, 
il n'y a pas de critères quant à l'interférence judiciaire qui sont suffisamment spéci-
fiques pour être d'un grand secours. 
Même s'il est évident que les tribunaux ne tiennent pas compte des dispositions 
apparemment claires des « clauses privatives » qui les excluent de toute considération 
d'un objet relevant d'une commission de relations de travail, il ne s'ensuit pas que 
la « clause privative » constitue du verbiage inutile. En même temps qu'il est 
désirable que les tribunaux administratifs soient soustraits jusqu'à un certain point 
de l'intervention des tribunaux, il est aussi souhaitable que ces commissions soient 
soumises à une forme quelconque de contrôle. Mais au fond, le réel problème réside 
dans la définition de la compétence elle-même. 
L E SENS DE LA COMPÉTENCE 
On doit se demander qui décide quoi. La compétence dans le contexte présent, 
signifie l'autorité de décider, soit correctement, soit incorrectement. Mais quand les 
tribunaux annulent les décisions des commissions sous prétexte d'une décision incor-
recte, ceci signifie que les commissions doivent décider correctement et pas autre-
ment. On a par exemple le cas «Police Méchantes'». Ici la cour cassa une décision 
du Ontario Labour Relations Board à l'effet que ces mécaniciens étaient exclus des 
dispositions du Labour Relations Act, selon la section 2 ( g ) de cette Loi. De même, 
dans le cas « Ontario Food Terminal Board », feu M. le juge Laidlaw déclarait que 
le Ontario Labour Relations Board ne pouvait déclarer le «Ontario Food Terminal 
Moard » une compagnie de la couronne ou non. Dans le cas Taylor, qui survint 
quelques mois après le cas Food Terminal, le juge en chef McRuer concluait 
qu'évidemment la « Commission » doit se prononcer sur plusieurs questions légales 
incidentes dans l'exécution de ses fonctions administratives, mais il ne voulait pas 
laisser entendre qu'il croyait la Commission habilitée à rendre des décisions judi-
ciaires en regard de sujets connexes sans possibilité de révision par voie de 
certiorari. 
76 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 21 , No. 1 
D E S COMMISSIONS SPÉCIALISÉES POUR DES OBJETS SPÉCIALISÉS 
Pour des objets spécialisés, se présentant souvent, impliquant continuellement 
les intérêts de groupes ayant un certain intérêt défini et exigeant un certain degré 
d'expertise, une commission spécialisée est nécessaire. L'établissement de commis-
sions possédant de larges pouvoirs à la fois d'enquête et d'action n'est rien de 
nouveau, non plus que la révision judiciaire de leurs conclusions. Dans la législation 
du travail, c'est le devoir des tribunaux de faire en sorte qu'elle atteigne son but. 
J'espère qu'il est vrai, comme le suggérait le Juge Abbott, que les membres de 
commissions sont au moins aussi compétents que les juges pour rendre des décisions 
sur des questions qui surgissent dans l'administration des Lois de relations de 
travail. Dans son commentaire sur le cas « Ontario Food Terminais » le professeur 
Laskin signala que la fonction de la Commission dans un tel cas était semblable 
à celle qu'elle aurait pu être appelée à accomplir en vertu de la section 2 de la 
Loi des relations de travail. Dans le cas « Associated Médical Services », 7 des 9 
juges soutinrent qu'il était normal pour le tribunal en question de considérer les 
mérites de la décision de la Commission à l'effet qu'un certain plaignant était une 
« personne » pour les fins de la Loi des relations de travail. Au fond, ce qui importe, 
c'est le concept de « jurisdiction » et les pour et les contre d'un concept relative-
ment large ou relativement étroit. Les possibilités peuvent être arrangées en une 
sorte d'éventail. A une extrémité, les questions ressortissant du droit constitution-
nel, dans lesquelles les tribunaux ont compétence. Puis les questions générales 
d'interprétation et l'ensemble des règles de la justice naturelle. Et à peu près 
au milieu de l'éventail, diverses questions : une personne est-elle membre d'un 
corps de police ? Une certaine personne est-elle un employé d'un certain employeur ? 
Une telle organisation est-elle une union ouvrière ? A l'autre extrémité de l'éven-
tail, on trouve toute une série de questions qui relèvent de la compétence des 
commissions ; le meilleur exemple serait celui-ci : une personne, en tant qu'employé, 
fait-elle partie de l'union ouvrière impliquée ? 
L A DISTINCTION ENTRE QUESTION PRINCIPALE ET QUESTION CONNEXE 
Ainsi, on peut classifier les questions entre celles qui peuvent nettement être 
révisées et celles qui ne le peuvent pas. Le critère juridique est le suivant : une 
telle question est la question principale soumise au tribunal ou plutôt elle en est 
une «extr insèque», «connexe» et «prél iminaire». Evidemment, ce sont les tribu-
naux qui possèdent la compétence pour déterminer si une commission peut se 
prononcer sur une question selon les pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés. 
Même si on continue à distinguer la question « principale » de la question 
«connexe», je ne peux laisser le débat sans référer à Lord Esher qui suggérait, 
dans les cas « Income Tax Commissionners et Bradley », que la législature pourrait 
conférer à la commission une compétence telle que, selon moi, l'intervention judi-
ciaire serait reportée à un stage ultérieur. 
LES RÈGLES DE I A JUSTICE NATURELLE 
Les règles de la justice naturelle constituent un chapitre spécial dans la ques-
tion de la compétence. Celles-ci ont été longuement étudiées et, en règle générale, 
il n'y a rien de remarquable dans les récents cas canadiens sur ce point. 
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Des questions de défaut d'avis surviennent avec une fréquence alarmante. 
Pour sûr, c'est la règle que tout*» information qui peut nuire à une partie autre que 
celle qui informe doit être fournie à cette autre partie. Ceci est également vrai 
pour la plaidoirie. Ainsi dans le cas Forest Industrial Relations, le juge Judson décla-
rait qu'après avoir écouté une partie et également la réponse de l'autre, la Commis-
sion peut, sans déroger aux règles de la justice naturelle, déclarer que le débat 
a duré assez longtemps et qu'il est temps d'y mettre fin. Dans le cas Jein Patrick, 
la Cour d'Appel de la Saskatchewan cassa une accréditation prétextant une encoche 
à la justice naturelle par le refus d'accorder un ajournement. 
Une variation quelque peu troublante sur les notions sous-jacentes aux exi-
gences d'avis apparaît dans des questions concernant l'acceptation de la preuve. 
Dans le cas Trenton Construction Workers Association, où le statut d'une organisa-
tion comme union ouvrière était en question, le tribunal décida que le Ontario 
Labour Relations Board s'était trompé « i n resorting to évidence that had been 
given before a Board differently constituted in regard to another application ». Si 
la décision signifie que les faits découverts dans des cas précédents ne peuvent 
jamais être utilisés, alors j'estime respectueusement que c'est aller trop loin. 
Le dernier motif pour révision que je désire considérer s'exprime par cette 
phrase difficile à comprendre et d'une grande source de confusion : « erreur en 
droit prima facie ». Il s'agit d'une sorte d'erreur quelque peu spéciale. Dans le 
cas Tag's Plumbing, on s'appuya sur ce motif pour attaquer par voie de certiorari 
la décision du Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board à savoir qu'un requérant 
dans un cas de pratique interdite de travail était une union ouvrière « directement 
concernée » dans certains événements. 
Le mystère de ce motif de révision peut, selon moi, trouver son explication 
sur une base historique. Le cas moderne par lequel l'idée d'une «erreur en droit 
prima facie », devint monnaie courante fut le cas Northumberland, auquel on a 
référé dans plusieurs décisions canadiennes. Le certiorari pour casser une décision 
était en réalité une nouvelle application d'un principe depuis longtemps reconnu. 
La question du prima facie devint alors, d'après les mots de Lord Summer, « l e 
visage impénétrable du sphinx ». C'est pour cette raison que ce motif fut très peu 
utilisé jusqu'à son application aux tribunaux administratifs en 1952. 
L A QUESTION DE LA CLAUSE PRIVATIVE 
Aucune clause privative n'empêchera les tribunaux de réviser la compétence 
de tribunaux inférieurs ou de tribunaux statutaires (statutary), comme il a été 
démontré. Cette clause cependant devrait s'appliquer proprement, en empêchant, 
par exemple, les tribunaux de réviser le travail des Commissions à l'intérieur de 
leur compétence. Qu'adviendrait-il sans une telle clause ? Ce n'est pas le cas que 
les tribunaux interféreraient à volonté. Il y a eu, règle générale, deux motifs pour 
le bref en certiorari : 1 ) défaut de juridiction et 2 ) erreur en droit prima facie. 
L'effet de la clause privative doit être l'élimination du deuxième motif. Ceci est 
d'ailleurs confirmé par le jugement rendu par le juge Roack dans le cas Bradley. 
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CONCLUSION 
La seule conclusion valable, selon moi, c'est que la clause privative ne veut 
rien dire. En effet, d'après le raisonnement du juge Smith, cette clause ne peut 
exclure le bref en certiorari sous aucun des deux motifs énoncés plus haut. Donc 
la seule raison d'être optimiste ici c'est la pensée que présumément une clause pri-
vative quelconque puisse signifier quelque chose, dès qu'elle est suffisamment 
«formelle ». 
DÉPARTEMENT DES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 
XXIe CONGRÈS DES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES DE LAVAL 
18 et 19 avril 1966 
UNE POLITIQUE GLOBALE DE MÀIN-D'OEUVRE ? 
LUNDI, 18 AVRIL 1966 
Une politique de main-d'oeuvre: problèmes impliqués 
Quels sont les problèmes que posent l'élaboration et la mise en 
application d'une politique de main-d'oeuvre ? Quelles sont les 
forces et les faiblesses des politiques actuelles de main-d'oeuvre ? 
Est-il opportun de songer à l'élaboration d'une politique globale 
en matière de main-d'oeuvre ? 
Quelle serait la nature d'une telle politique ? 
Nécessité d'une politique globale de main-d'oeuvre 
Est-ce qu'une coordination des politiques et programmes de main-
d'oeuvre s'avère nécessaire ? Est-ce que les changements techno-
logiques et leurs implications nous invitent à considérer la possi-
bilité d'une politique globale de main-d'oeuvre ? 
COMMENTAIRES ET POINTS DE VUE 
MARDI, 19 AVRIL 1966 
Mise en oeuvre d'une politique globale de main-d'oeuvre 
a ) Mécanismes institutionnels .• Est-il possible de jeter les bases 
d'un organisme supérieur qui se chargerait de l'élaboration et 
de la mise en application d'une politique de main-d'oeuvre ? 
Quels seraient la nature, les objectifs, la composition d'un 
tel organisme ? 
b ) Rôle des partenaires : Points de vue syndical et patronal sur 
le rôle des partenaires dans l'élaboration et l'application d'une 
politique de main-d'oeuvre. 
Négociation collective et politique de main-d'oeuvre 
La négociation collective présente-t-elle un instrument adéquat 
en matière de préservation et allocation de main-d'oeuvre ? En 
quoi une politique de main-d'oeuvre peut affecter le processus 
actuel de la négociation collective ? 
Politiques de main-d'oeuvre: implications constitutionnelles 
BANQUET DE CLÔTURE 
Education et politique de main-d'oeuvre 
